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Abstract—Witnessing the increasingly pervasive deployment
of security video surveillance systems(VSS), more and more
individuals have become concerned with the issues of privacy
violations. While the majority of the public have a favorable
view of surveillance in terms of crime deterrence, individuals
do not accept the invasive monitoring of their private life. To
date, however, there is not a lightweight and secure privacy-
preserving solution for video surveillance systems. The recent
success of blockchain (BC) technologies and their applications
in the Internet of Things (IoT) shed a light on this challenging
issue. In this paper, we propose a Lightweight, Blockchain-based
Privacy protection (Lib-Pri) scheme for surveillance cameras at
the edge. It enables the VSS to perform surveillance without
compromising the privacy of people captured in the videos.
The Lib-Pri system transforms the deployed VSS into a system
that functions as a federated blockchain network capable of
carrying out integrity checking, blurring keys management,
feature sharing, and video access sanctioning. The policy-based
enforcement of privacy measures is carried out at the edge devices
for real-time video analytics without cluttering the network.
Keywords-Privacy, Lightweight Blockchain, Smart Surveil-
lance, Edge Device, Off-site Storage.
I. INTRODUCTION
Video surveillance cameras are pervasive in public places in
response to growing security concerns [11], [16]. According
to a report produced by IHS Markit, there are about 245
millions surveillance cameras in operation today. London is
the city with the highest number of cameras, where an average
Londoner is estimated to be caught on camera 300 times a
day. The number in China is expected to grow more than
three times by the year 2020 [1], [15]. Clearly individuals’
privacy is at stake! People are being observed with or without
their awareness almost wherever they go. This situation widely
incurs concerns in the violation of individual’s privacy.
The more powerful the modern surveillance cameras be-
come, the more likely they are to be abused to gather private
information. Authorized security personnel in charge of the
surveillance system might abuse the cameras for voyeurism,
cyber stalking, and unauthorized collection of data on activities
or behaviors of individuals [13], [15], [17]. Maneuverable
cameras, like pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) camera, could be abused
and directed to intrusively spy on other people in their
apartments. For instance, there was an investigation launched
after a security guard spied on the private apartment of the
German Chancellor Angela Merkel using a museum’s closed
circuit television (CCTV) camera [1], [6]. Obviously, while
the benefits of surveillance greatly outweigh the potential risks,
surveillance and the privacy of people should be balanced out.
There has been a number of efforts to address the privacy
requirements through the introduction of smart cameras with
embedded privacy curtailments in lieu of trying to abandon the
practice of surveillance [4], [13], [15], [17], [18]. However, a
resource and bandwidth aware privacy-protection mechanism
is still missing in most surveillance camera systems today.
The Bitcoin has substantiated how the BC technology can
decentralize trusted computing models [10]. A light-weight
blockchain along with the concept of identity-based distributed
data possession in multi-cloud storage can be leveraged to
ensure privacy and authorized access in smart surveillance [3],
[7], [9], [14]. Due to concerns on privacy and performance
issues, however, public blockchain is not an ideal candidate.
Instead, a private blockchain has been considered where
only authenticated member nodes join [2], [19]. Therefore,
a lightweight, closed-group blockchain that supports decen-
tralized applications like surveillance that entails high speed
and privacy could meet the requirements.
In this position paper, a lightweight blockchain-based pri-
vacy protection (Lib-Pri) scheme for smart surveillance at the
edge is proposed. It enables the construction of a privacy-
aware smart surveillance system by integrating the advanced
features of BC and smart contract with object detection (OD)
technologies coupled with image scrambling techniques. The
Lib-Pri system consists of three major parts in this privacy
and resource aware service: smart cameras, BC nodes and
users. The smart cameras are the edge devices with embedded
configurable set of privacy policies. The cameras capture
videos and process them using the attached single board
computer (SBC), e.g. the new Jetson Nano Module, a Tinker
board or Raspberry Pi. Privacy-sensitive objects are detected
and corresponding privacy protection measures are enforced.
The BC network ensures authenticity. Users are assigned with
different levels of access privileges to the videos, which are
defined in the smart contracts. In addition, an isolated storage
system is considered for the storage of reversibly scrambled
images or videos for law enforcement purposes.
The remainder of this paper is structured as ensues. The
architecture of the Lib-Pri system is described in Section II
followed by the explication of the privacy polices in Section
III. At last, the conclusive remarks and the direction of our
ongoing research are presented in Section IV.
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Fig. 1. Privacy-preserving Lite Blockchain-based Smart Surveillance.
II. LIB-PRI SYSTEM: ARCHITECTURE AND COMPONENTS
Figure 1 portrays the high-level overview of the proposed
Lib-Pri system, the Lightweight BC-based Privacy Protection
for smart surveillance at the edge. It comprises smart cameras
as edge devices, BC nodes, authorized users such as security
personnel or law enforcement officials, and off-BC storage.
A. Smart Surveillance Cameras At The Edge
The smart cameras function as edge devices. They capture
videos, perform frame splitting and reversible blurring follow-
ing an object detection as per the defined policies configured
in each camera. A pre-trained machine learning (ML) neural
network (NN) is loaded onto the edge for multiple objects
detection within a budgeted time. Features are extracted for
OD, detected objects that match those on the policy are
bounded, a blurring key is generated and securely shared by
means of a public crypto-system, and then the sensitive objects
are chaotically masked at the edge. The smart cameras also
support the opt-out policy when no attention is paid to privacy.
This boosts the public confidence that their images or videos
captured by the surveillance cameras will not be abused. The
opt-out option is defined in the smart contract, and it renders
the privacy policy useless when triggered by authorized users.
Many of the existing CCTV systems are centralized and
not “smart”. Videos analytics are performed at a centralized
locations. With the mounted SBCs, it is feasible to deploy
and run pre-trained object detection ML algorithms on edge
devices. Performing video analytics, information distillation,
object detection, and human face denaturing at the edge dras-
tically reduces the cameras egress bandwidth consumption.
Meanwhile, edge devices still suffer from resource constraints.
As a consequence, at times when the smart cameras fail to
meet the requirements of real-time video analytics, adopting a
hybrid of edge and fog computing paradigms is an alternative.
Some of the tasks will be offloaded to a near-site fog node,
i.e. a laptop, a tablet, or a smartphone.
B. The Lightweight Blockchain Network
A permissioned, private BC network is envisioned in the
Lib-Pri system, which is not open to public access. The Lib-Pri
system employs privacy-preserving smart contracts that define
privileges and access rules, which allow authorized users
access the videos without violating the privacy of individuals.
The existing smart contract however doesn’t preserve the
privacy and confidentiality of personal files or data when
shared to the BC nodes. In our proposal, the smart contract is
tailored for better handling of the privacy and confidentiality
issues. Users who try to access the video need to prove
themselves to the blockchain that they have the permission.
Besides, correctness of the references are validated by every
other node so that only authorized accesses are made and the
integrity of the video storage is verifiable. The reference in
this paper points to a variable on a mapping table that contains
actual references to the videos.
C. Off-Blockchain Storage
Storing data on the blockchain is expensive and the storage
requirements are impractical if video streams are stored in
replicated forms in every node of the blockchain network. As
a solution, a storage server/servers outside the blockchain net-
work is considered that could be connected to the blockchain.
The connection is made as per the business rules defined on the
smart contract. Only videos and images deemed important for
later law enforcement purposes are stored in the off-network
storage. Video frames containing objects that show offensive
behaviors and fugitives are marked according to the predefined
policies and are pushed to the storage. The hashed references
and germane access details are stored on the blockchain.
Besides, access histories important for auditing are logged
and stored on the off-BC storage. Only their references are
similarly shared to the BC nodes.
The blurring keys sharing is managed using a public key
crypto-system in two stages; between smart cameras and BC
nodes, and between the BC nodes and the off-BC storages
as necessary. When there is no need to store videos, the first
stage of key management suffice. The second stage is required
only when videos have to be stored for later use. Then, keys
are revoked the moment the corresponding video is deemed
unwanted and deleted.
D. Object Detection, Bounding And Masking
Mechanisms that could perform live video frame denatur-
ing for privacy purpose are required to be robust and fast.
Therefore, the accuracy, sophistication, and speed of live-video
processing method is vital. The functionality of our Lib-Pri
system includes detecting objects in an image or video frame,
adding bounding box, and applying reversible chaotic mask to
preserve privacy.
Object detection is a compute-intensive process. Hence, we
will design the state-of-the art object detection model, and
make an apropos offline training on sufficiently large data set.
The trained model will be loaded to the edge devices. In order
to avoid any possible violation of the budgeted time for live
video analytics, the fog server works along with an edge device
that supports pipe-lining and parallel processing of frames to
expedite the process.
Following the successful detection of an object and extrac-
tion of coordinates of the bounding box, masking is done using
a chaotic method to conserve privacy. The method is inspired
by the earlier reported researches [5], [12], [18]. The initial
conditions of the chaotic generator that comprises both floating
and integral values are used as the key.
E. Spotting Fugitives
Our Lib-Pri system is able to identify fugitives after the first
time they were caught doing something deemed an aggressive
or a criminal act. Once some individuals were detected (with
visible face) doing something wrong and disappeared, the
authorized law enforcement people are provided with the
option to flag the germane video frames or images containing
misconduct as wanted. The fugitive’s facial features required
for comparison are dispatched to the edge with their original
references pushed to the blockchain network nodes. When
a match is obtained by any of the cameras demanded to
spot the escapees, they will send an immediate alert message
comprising the location and identity of the fugitive.
III. PRIVACY POLICIES
As far as video surveillance is concerned, a number of argu-
ments and views have been raised pro and against of it. Covert
government surveillance is one of the push factors that caused
the public to grow suspicious about it. Governments often
quote the famous Margalit’s saying: “If you have got nothing
to hide, you have got nothing to worry about.” However, many
argue against that it is never all about hiding something, it is all
about that being none of other people’s business. They argue
in favor of the quote ”I don’t have anything to hide, but I don’t
have anything I feel like showing to you, either” [8]. Putting it
another, many people concur on the usefulness of surveillance
system for security purposes but they firmly believe that
the indiscriminately pervasive and expansive deployment has
endangered constitutionally enshrined values like the right of
anonymity, a form of privacy. People going to bars, infertility
clinic, doctors, etc. want to be anonymous. But cameras in
public places enable officials to non-selectively observe these
routine activities of individuals irrespective of whether they are
law-abiding citizens or criminals. Besides, there is a risk that
recorded footage can be abused or leaked. Hence, the public
want the surveillance system to be aware of privacy-sensitive
things.
Therefore, privacy and access policies are included in the
Lib-Pri system to guard against the abuses of surveillance
videos by authorized officials or other users, including un-
warranted monitoring, peeping, and leaking. Privacy policies
that specify which objects or video frames should be denatured
are incorporated in smart cameras, or more precisely speaking,
on the mounted edge computing devices. The privacy policies
recognize the scenarios, objects, activities, or simply locations
Fig. 2. The Object Detection, Masking, and Access policing Processes.
that are not permitted to be posted publicly. The fine-grained
access privilege policies define who accesses what and how.
Access control is enforced by the smart contract embedded
in the BC network. As a private BC network, the access is not
anonymous as what the public blockchain network allows for
Bitcoin. The user has to be verified as one of the privileged
users who are authorized to watch the requested videos. The
policy is set to ensure that things are effectively obscured if
they have the potential of revealing information pertinent to
an individual’s privacy. The contents or objects considered in
the privacy policy of our proposed system are listed as ensues.
The entire policing process is depicted in Fig. 2.
1) By default, the face of every captured individual is
reversibly scrambled. Faces can only be recovered when
proof to verify the identity of someone engaged in
misdeeds is required (for example at a court of law).
2) To prevent peeping at people doing private things at
home or capturing videos via windows by maneuver-
ing cameras, objects on frames identified as windows
are reversibly masked at the edge. This is an act of
voyeurism unless cameras are warranted to do so in an
opt-out mode. Another case where the opt-out option
could be enforced is when, for instance, drones with
smart cameras are on exigent or search-and-rescue mis-
sion where clear detection of humans or objects is of
paramount importance and privacy is the least concern.
3) Bedrooms, bathrooms, plate numbers, personal informa-
tion tags, and other things that could reveal information
that leads to potential privacy breach are masked.
4) Fine-grained access control policies and privileges are
set as part of the privacy policies. They can be legiti-
mately and authorizedly updated or revoked at any time.
5) In a frame containing nude images of individuals the
face, genitals, buttocks, and breasts are scrambled.
6) Video frames with aggressive behaviors like throwing a
fist, pointing guns, and an act of vandalizing properties
are flagged and stored for later law enforcement uses.
7) References to the identities of viewers or those who
access the videos are embedded into the video frames
they viewed or accessed to reduce unauthorized leaking.
8) To prevent leaking of videos or images, videos or images
stored cannot be transferred or copied. They can only
be viewed by authorized law enforcement people with
the right privileges. Only when need arises, warranted
people could do the transfer or copying activities.
9) Keys generated for denaturing frames at the camera
end are automatically added to the authorized viewers’
details on the blockchain based on their privileges and
access nuances defined on the privacy policies. A key is
kept as long as a reference to the corresponding stored
video exists in the BC nodes.
10) There is an opt-out option which could be triggered by
authorized users whenever privacy is deemed unimpor-
tant. For instance, for live examination proctoring, the
blurring option might not be required.
11) Different nodes of the blockchain network could have
different sets of policies. Even cameras could be set indi-
vidually or zone-wise to have different privacy policies.
12) The smart contracts contain attributes common across
the surveillance facility on top of the attributes and
requirements unique to each organization or community
who own the system.
13) Access histories of stored or viewed videos are logged
and shared onto the blockchain based on the details
defined in smart contracts. Viewer’s identity, time of
view or access, privileges, and references of accessed
parts are logged and stored.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND WORKS IN PROGRESS
It is a violation of the privacy rights of individuals and
a debacle of the rule of law to covertly and non-selectively
monitor people regardless of whether they are suspects or
not. This is how most of today’s safety/security surveillance
systems operate. They give the least concern to privacy.
In this position paper, we are intending to integrate and
leverage the advantages of the blockchain, smart contract,
object detection, and edge computing technologies to make
the existing video surveillance systems privacy-aware. In the
proposed Lib-Pri system, frame splitting, object detection and
bounding, and policy-based enforcement of privacy measures
are performed at the edge devices, i.e. the smart cameras,
to enable real-time video analytics without congesting the
communication network. Offensive behaviors of individuals
are detected by an object-detection network on the edge device
and is then offloaded to an off-blockchain storage. Fugitives
are also identified by comparing previous facial features and
those extracted from the live video frames. To discourage
leaking of videos and images, information specific to the
viewers is embedded into the videos/images automatically and
a corresponding log-reference is pushed to the BC.
Our on-going efforts consist of multiple tasks, including:
• Data set collection and labeling for the NN training;
• Polishing and encoding the proposed privacy policies into
smart contracts; and
• A prototype of the Lib-Pri system is being built, which
includes multiple surveillance cameras with SBCs like
mounted Raspberry Pi, smartphones and laptops that
function as fog devices.
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